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that strategies to educate the insured Medicare population about coverage of preventive services may
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Although economists typically assume that economic transactions occur with perfect 
knowledge, consumers in health care markets often demand medical care with very limited 
information on product characteristics and prices, and frequently rely on providers to act as their 
agents (Arrow, 1963). Educational interventions to increase consumers’ knowledge of the costs 
and/or probable benefits of medical care are, however, feasible.  In 1992, the United States 
Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) introduced coverage for Medicare beneficiaries 
of two preventive services not previously covered– influenza vaccinations and mammograms.  
Since then, HCFA, which was recently renamed  the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), has used multiple communication strategies to inform beneficiaries of these benefits, 
such as employing Medicare carriers to promote the use of preventive care in order to reduce the 
risk of illness or avoidable hospitalization. 
Previous research suggests that educational interventions can translate into increased use 
of services in general, and of preventive services in particular.  Using data from a household 
survey conducted in the mid-1970s, Kenkel (1990) measured consumers’ health knowledge by 
responses to a set of questions about the symptoms associated with diabetes, heart disease, 
cancer and tuberculosis.  He found that better informed consumers were significantly more likely 
to visit a physician. Hsieh and Lin (1997) examined the effect of information on demand for 
preventive care (tests for blood pressure and blood sugar levels, and urinalysis) among elderly 
persons in Taiwan.  Their measures of information were based on responses to questions about 




diabetes, and the consequences of poor diabetes or high blood pressure management.  Their 
results generally supported the notion that better informed respondents were more likely to 
obtained the preventive services they studied. 
The value of some policies to promote preventive service use has also been clearly 
suggested by previous analyses.  The cost of treating influenza or comorbidities related to it is 
substantial in both the hospital and physician settings (McBean et al., 1993).  Furthermore, the 
cost-effectiveness of the vaccination has been documented in earlier studies (U.S. OTA, 1981; 
Govert et al., 1994).  In the case of the cost-effectiveness mammography screening among 
elderly women, the evidence is not as convincing as influenza vaccination (Blustein and Weiss, 
1998) due to the relatively earlier incidence of breast cancer in women.  However, several recent 
studies have demonstrated that the effectiveness-cost ratio of mammography screening for 
elderly women can be high (Rosenquist and Lindfors, 1998; Wolstenholme, Smith and Whynes, 
1998).  
  New evidence suggests that influenza vaccinations and mammograms among the elderly 
increased between 1992 and 1997.  In 1997, 62 percent of Medicare beneficiaries reported that 
they obtained a flu shot compared to 44 percent in 1992, and 43 percent of women reported 
obtaining a mammogram compared to 19% in 1992 (Westat, 1998).  While a detailed analysis of 
these increases, and the possible role of consumer knowledge and education, has yet to be carried 
out, the latest empirical analysis on the factors affecting influenza vaccination by Mullahy (1999) 
argues that an understanding of the role education and the knowledge of medical benefits play in 
the receipt of a flu shot would be a valuable extension of earlier research.   
  Previous studies have not specifically addressed the impact of knowledge of benefits on 
service utilization, but recent data indicate that Medicare enrollees are in general poorly 





* identified multiple deficiencies in beneficiaries’ basic knowledge of the 
Medicare program (Barents Group LLC, et al 1998).  Although most beneficiaries know about 
the major features of Medicare, they tended to have inadequate knowledge of services that are 
infrequently used (such as long term care, second surgical opinion, or coverage of durable 
medical equipment) or recently implemented benefits (such as influenza and pneumonia 
vaccinations). These findings are supported by McCall et al (1986) who surveyed Medicare 
beneficiaries in six states and reported a low level of knowledge of Medicare benefits and 
supplemental policy benefits.  These authors also found that respondents were more likely to be 
aware of benefits for the services they use most, including eyeglasses, physician care, and 
prescription drugs, rather than infrequently used services such as hospital or nursing home care.  
It is also worth noting that other studies of the general population (rather than just Medicare 
enrollees) also document gaps and misinformation in consumers’ reported knowledge of health 
plans and entitlement programs (Isaacs 1996; Blendon et al, 1997).  
In this paper, we explicitly examine the impact of elderly persons’ knowledge of 
Medicare benefits on the demand for preventive health care using supplemental questions from 
Round 18 of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) regarding beneficiary knowledge 
of Medicare.  The aim of this analysis is to identify the marginal effect of such benefit 
knowledge on demand in order to better value future initiatives to create a more informed health 
care consumer.  In the remainder of this paper, we describe our conceptual model, methods, 
study population, estimation results, interpretations of our empirical findings, and conclusions. 
 
                                                           
* This project intended to provide CMS with an understanding of the needs of Medicare beneficiaries with respect to 
two basic questions: what information do beneficiaries want and need from CMS; and how can CMS best get this 
information to beneficiaries.  This project was conducted by the Barents Group LLC, the Project HOPE Center for 





  We use a simple conceptual framework of consumer demand for preventive care to 
motivate and interpret our empirical work. In this framework, the consumer faces two uncertain 
states of the world in which she is either exposed or not exposed to a preventable disease. 
Corresponding probabilities are π E  and π N  (= 1 - π E). The consumer’s utility function in each 
state, i, is U(Hi,Zi;X) ( i = E,N), where Hi is realized health status, Zi is spending on all other 
goods and services except the prevention of the preventable disease, and X is a vector of socio-
demographic characteristics describing the consumer. HN is health status in the absence of the 
disease and we let λ  denote the decline in health status due to the disease, Y denote consumer 
income, and C denote the cost of preventive services. Assuming that the consumer maximizes 
expected utility and that preventive services reduce the probability of disease occurrence in the 
event of exposure by the factor (1-θ ) (with 0≤θ≤ 1), the consumer will choose to obtain 
preventive services if      
(1) θπ E⋅  U(HN-λ , Y-C;Z)+ (1-θπ E)⋅  U(HN, Y-C;Z) > π E⋅  U(HN-λ , Y;Z)+ (1-π E)⋅  U(HN, Y;Z). 
Taking a first-order Taylor series approximation around (HN, Y). subtracting common terms 
from both sides and rearranging terms, (1) becomes 
(2) -(1-θπ E)λ (∂ U/∂ H) > C(∂ U/∂ Y). 
This simply states that the consumer obtains preventive services when the expected utility gain 
from reduced risk of the disease exceeds the utility loss from the financial cost of the services. 
  The simple framework highlights several ways in which the level of consumer knowledge 
can impact the decision to obtain preventive services. First, in the absence of knowledge that the 




underestimate their risk of exposure (π E) and/or the severity of the disease (λ ). Third, the 
uninformed consumer may underestimate the effectiveness of the service in preventing the 
disease (1-θ ). In formal terms, the dependence of the consumer’s decision upon the level of 
knowledge, denoted by K, can be represented in (1) and (2) above by making the variables C, λ , 
θ , and π E functions of K. 
  While this simple model only allows socio-demographc characteristics (the vector X) to 
influence the consumer’s decision via preferences, we recognize that other channels for these 
influences may in fact be operative. The level of knowledge about key variables (C,λ ,θ ,π E) may 
be correlated with some elements of X. Exposure risk (λ ,θ ,π E) may also vary with socio-
demographic characteristics. To the extent that beneficiaries in varying circumstances differ in 
the quality of medical care they can access, they may also face differing levels of λ  and θ . 
In the empirical implementation of our model, consumer perceptions of C,λ ,θ ,π E  are not 
directly observable determinants of preventive service use.  We seek to control for variations in 
these magnitudes across the sample by including exogenous variables relating to consumer 
health status and epidemiologic risk factors, access to care, income, other socio-demographic 
characteristics, and consumer knowledge of Medicare coverage for preventive services.  The 
impact of the consumer knowledge variable, which is the primary focus of our analysis, is 
largely a reflection of the influence of C on consumer decisions.  Those who know that the 
service is covered are aware that the out-of-pocket cost for the service itself is zero and those 
who do not know this overestimate this cost.  While this suggests that the coefficient for the 
consumer knowledge variable in our empirical estimates is mainly a price effect on demand, we 




or  lower estimates of θ , because the educational interventions that promoted benefit knowledge 
also increased awareness of risks and consequences of exposure and efficacy of prevention.  As 
discussed below, we also follow previous researchers in allowing for the possibility that the 
consumer knowledge variable is itself endogenous and therefore employ an instrumental 
variables estimation method. 
Data Sources 
  The principal data source used in our analysis is the annual Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey (MCBS).  Administered to a nationally representative sample of Medicare beneficiaries, 
the MCBS obtains information from beneficiaries on socio-demographic characteristics, use of 
medical care, and indicators of health status and illness.  Other respondent characteristics 
obtained in the survey include education, household composition, health status, income, and 
supplemental insurance coverage.  The database also includes the Medicare claims records for 
respondents.  These claims records describe the exact health services provided and reimbursed 
and serve to supplement the beneficiary’s recollection of whether certain medical services, such 
as mammography, were provided.  Once participating in the survey, a beneficiary is surveyed 
three times a year for an in-depth personal interview for three years.  Beneficiaries who die 
during the course of their survey participation are replaced in the following year of the survey to 
keep the average number of survey participants at roughly 14,000 beneficiaries. 
In this analysis, we used data on respondent characteristics from Round 16 of the MCBS 
(the “health access survey”) administered in Fall, 1996.  Information on respondents’ knowledge 
of benefits was obtained from supplemental questions from Round 18 of the MCBS, which was 
administered later in summer 1997.  The questions included a short quiz to test beneficiary 




Handbook and their access to communication technologies.  We use five quiz questions from 
Round 18.  (These questions are given in our Appendix.)  The first two ask if flu shot and 
mammography are covered services.  The remaining three questions test knowledge of Medicare 
coverage of physical examinations, rules on provider payment and assignment, and rights to 
appeal a payment decision. 
An additional data component for the analysis was claims data for all beneficiaries from 
the Medicare 5% Part B physician file for calendar year 1996. From these data, we computed 
utilization rates for flu shots and mammography for each 5-digit zip code. (Denominators for 
these rates were the total number of beneficiaries reporting any claims in each zip code in 1996.) 
These rates were matched by zip codes of residence to the beneficiaries in our analysis and were 
used as explanatory variables to control for possible neighborhood effects. Differences in 
“neighborhood” use rates may be indicative of patterns of diffusion of information (Besley and 
Case, 1993) since consumers may learn about their benefits from neighbors who used the service 
in question. These rates could also be capturing zip-code-specific variations in access to services 
or variations in preferences that we cold not directly observe. 
The binary dependent variables in our analysis, for obtaining a mammogram and a flu 
shot, were constructed from one year of claims data (September 1, 1997 to August 31, 1998) 
following the end of interviewing for Round 18 of the MCBS survey (inAugust 1997). (For 
respondents in our study whose participation in the MCBS ended before August 31, 1998, , we 
obtained their additional claims data from CMS to complete our 12-month follow-up period)  
Thus our dependent variable measures of utilization were collected subsequent to our measures 




We also obtained binary indicators of prior use for mammogram and flu shots for MCBS 
respondents pertain to calendar 1995.  These were based on self-report data in the 1995 MCBS 
Cost and Use file. 
Estimation Methods and Model Specification 
In estimating the effects of consumer knowledge on service use, previous researchers 
(Kenkel, 1990; Hsieh and Lin, 1997) have recognized the potential problem that estimated 
knowledge coefficients are contaminated by simultaneity bias,In particular, this could arise if 
persons with stronger preferences for using a particular service gain  knowledge about that 
service and its coverage from their providers and from prior utilization experiences.  Following 
Kenkel, and Hsieh and Lin, we address this problem via the use of instrumental variables for our 
measures of benefit knowledge. 
In particular, consumer knowledge of benefits is measured directly by a binary indicator 
for the correct response to the coverage of flu shot or mammogram quiz questions. Indicators of 
responses to the other quiz questions, relating to Medicare program adminstration, were used as 
instrumental variables for these knowledge of benefits measures.  This procedure was based on 
the rationale that enrollees with a good knowledge of the Medicare program are likely to know 
about coverage of preventive health care while a “taste” for preventive care will not be correlated 
with general Medicare program knowledge.As in Mullahy’s recent work on flu shots, we 
estimate a two-stage model with binary dependent variables.  The estimated models take the 
form 
1)   Ki = a0 + a1Yi +Pi + ui 
2)  Di = b0 + b1Yi + b2Ki + vi 
where  K is the binary indicator of benefit knolwedge for beneficiary i Pi is a two-element vector 




preventive service use, Yi is a vector of exogenous determinants of preventive service demand, 
and uiand viare random errors that may be correlated. The explanatory variables in the vector Yi 
include determinants of the beneficiary’s demand such as income, supplementary insurance 
coverage, education, and demographic characteristics. Measures of beneficiary health 
characteristics are included on the assumption that these will affect the beneficiary’s perceptions 
of exposure risk, severity of illness consequences, and preventive service effectiveness. 
Neighborhood use measures are included to account for geographic differences in access which 
may be correlated with time costs of obtaining preventive services (a component of C in our 
conceptual model) and diffusion of benefit knowledge Finally, we also include a prior use 
variable based on the beneficiary’s self-reported prior year use of the preventive service 
examined.  Prior use will increase consumer knowledge through experience.  It will also proxy 
for unmeasured “taste” factors that are stable over time.  Thus, we view the inclusion of prior use 
as providing a more stringent test of the pure effect of benefit knowledge on demand. More 
specific definitions for these variables are given in Table 1. 
Equations (1) and (2) are estimated via two-stage least squares with Huber-White robust 
standard-error estimates for coefficients. The properties of this estimation method for 
simultaneous equations with binary dependent variables have previously been described by 
Heckman and McCurdy (1985). A recent example of applying this method in a closely-related 
context is Mullahy (1999). We note that concern over several deficiencies of least-squares 
estimation of linear probability models should be relatively minor in our application. In 
particular, robust standard-error estimation allows for heteroscedasticity, while specification 
error due to the assumption of a linear functional form should not be a major problem with 
dependent variables whose mean values are far from the extremes of the 0-1 interval.  




  The core analytic sample for the analysis contains complete data for beneficiaries age 65 
and older who were living in the community (i.e., who were not living in a short-term or long-
term care facility) and who answered Rounds 16, 17, and 18 of the MCBS.  We excluded 
respondents from this subset who had missing data for the dependent variables or key beneficiary 
characteristics, such as income information.  Respondents enrolled in Medicare managed care 
health plans were also included provided their health service utilization data, which would 
normally be abstracted from administrative claims data, was not missing. An analysis of 
excluded respondents did not reveal significant economic or demographic differences from the 
non-excluded respondents.  Although income differences could not be determined directly for 
the excluded respondents, a slightly higher percentage of beneficiaries with Medicaid eligibility, 
and a lower percentage of beneficiaries with higher education levels, were in the non-excluded 
(i.e., study) sample.   
  Table 1 summarizes the two study samples, one for the entire population to model flu shot 
demand and the other restricted to women for modeling mammography screening demand.  The 
largest age group in the sample is the 65 to 74 year olds, who make up 41 percent of the total 
sample.  A slight majority of beneficiaries are women (51 percent).  About 83 percent of 
Medicare beneficiaries in the sample are White non-Hispanic, with African Americans (non-
Hispanic) comprising the second largest racial group (9 percent), and Hispanics making up 6 
percent of the sample.  Many Medicare beneficiaries have low incomes, with the largest income 
group being $15,000 or less (about 46 percent of the sample).  About 41 percent of the sample 
has not completed high school.  Over half of beneficiaries live with their spouse (53 percent). 
Approximately one-third of the sample live in the south (35 percent), and three-quarters live in a 




nearly three quarters of the sample (71 percent) have some supplemental coverage (e.g., 
Medigap) purchased directly or provided by a former employer.   
  A majority of beneficiaries reported they were in excellent, very good, or good health (78 
percent).  However, 38 percent have been told they have a chronic heart condition, 18 percent 
have been told they have cancer, 15 percent have diabetes, 13 percent have emphysema, asthma, 
or COPD, and 11 percent have had a stroke.  About 41 percent of beneficiaries have a visual 
impairment (have some or a lot of trouble seeing) or are blind, while about 45 percent are hard of 
hearing (have some or a lot of trouble hearing) or are deaf.  
Estimation Results 
Table 2 presents the results of the first-stage regressions on 1) flu shot benefit knowledge 
for the entire study population and 2) women's knowledge of the mammography screening 
benefit. General Medicare knowledge is found to be positively and significantly related to flu 
shot benefit knowledge.  The same is true for prior use of flu shots.  Those likely to have greater 
knowledge of the benefit are those with supplemental coverage and those living in rural areas.  
Given that supplemental carriers provide another source of information about health benefits, 
this result is not surprising.  Beneficiaries residing in rural areas may be less inundated with 
information than urban populations, and may be better able to attend the information they do 
receive.  We may also be observing the impact of information campaigns conducted by CMS, the 
American Association of Retired Persons, and other social and civic organizations with high 
participation in rural regions, such as the Rotary Club and Lions Club.  Those residing in the 
South are more likely to know about the benefit than those in the Northeast.  Those with a heart 
condition are more likely to be knowledgeable about the benefit as well.  Since heart disease can 
require a significant interaction with health care delivery and finance systems, spillover 




also more knowledgeable about flu shots.  Two explanations for this result may be that a spouse 
is another information source, as well as a direct incentive to keep one's partner healthy.  Those 
less likely to know about the benefit include blacks and males. 
 A number of the results regarding women’s knowledge of mammography screening are 
similar to those found for flu shot benefit knowledge.  The factors with the strongest positive 
effects on knowledge of the mammography benefit are again good knowledge of general 
Medicare program rules and prior use of mammography.  Significant positive effects are again 
observed for Medigap coverage and for residence in the South.  Other features of the results do 
not parallel the findings for flu shot knowledge. Blacks and Hispanics are significantly more 
likely to know about the mammography benefit, as are persons with Medicaid coverage.  Older 
beneficiaries are significantly less likely to know about the mammography benefit.  There is also 
stronger evidence of regional differences in benefit knowledge. One of the largest 
mammography benefit knowledge marginal effects was associated with women residing in 
Puerto Rico, which again suggests the importance or regional information sources or campaigns. 
There is also a positive relationship for women with a history of cancer, which may reflect 
increased concern with cancer prevention.   
The OLS and 2SLS second stage estimation results for flu shot and mammography 
screening demand are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.  Benefit knowledge for each of 
the two preventive services and prior use had strongly significant impacts on service use in both 
OLS and 2SLS models.  Comparison of the 2SLS and OLS results indicates that OLS tends to 
yield a downward-biased estimate of the impact of knowledge on use.  This finding is somewhat 
surprising but could be explained, at least in part, by the possibility that the prior use variable 
accounts for much of the positive correlation between unobservables that increase benefit 




the flu shot and mammography 2SLS models Basmann's (1960) test fails to reject our 
overidentifying exclusion restrictions.   
Since the two preventive services are covered with no out-of-pocket cost to the consumer, 
the interpretation of the strongly positive results for the Medigap and Medicaid dummies (for 
both services) and for the high income dummy (in the case of mammography) is not the usual 
straightforward confirmation of negative own-price and positive income effects on demand.  An 
alternative hypothesis concerning insurance effects is that cross-price effects on preventive 
service demand are positive.  Beneficiaries who use more curative services (because of lower 
out-of-pocket price) may also be more likely to receive recommendations from their physicians 
to obtain preventive services.  In the case of influenza vaccinations, complementarity in demand 
could also arise from joint time costs: the time and inconvenience of obtaining a vaccination are 
greatly reduced if it is received at the same time and in the same provider location in which 
curative services are received.  Both of these arguments could also account for positive income 
effects if the income effect on demand for curative services is also positive. 
Race and ethnicity appear to have significant effects on flu shot demand.  Specifically, 
black beneficiaries and Hispanics have significantly lower probabilities of receiving a flu shot, 
ceteris paribus. Corresponding effects on mammography demand, however, are not significant.. 
Our four education dummies are also insignificant in both Tables 3 and 4 although the pattern of 
point estimates for their coefficients suggests a positive gradient for a continuous education 
measure.  Other demographic variables have no significant effects on flu shot demand although 
there is weak evidence of a positive age effect.  In the case of mammography, age has a strongly 
negative effective while the dummy for marital status has a significantly positive coefficient. 
Relatively few of the results for the health problems and disability variables are 




likelihood of receiving each of the preventive services.  Women with a hearing problem have a 
significantly lower probability of mammography use. Those women with significant (four or 
more) limitations in activities of daily living (ADLs) are less likely to receive mammography 
screening.  This finding may reflect individuals who can not seek care independently.   
Results for location variables are mixed.  The rural population receives more of both 
preventive services than those residing in urban areas. On the other hand, neighborhood effects 
are not significant at the 0.05 level in either 2SLS model.  
In addition to the results just presented, we also estimated our two demand models with 
the prior use variables excluded.  This did not substantially alter our findings.  The magnitude of 
the TSLS coefficient for benefits knowledge increased by about 35% in the flu shot model but 
was essentially unchanged in the mammography model.  Corresponding OLS coefficients 
increased in magnitude by about 90% in the flu shot model and about 45 % in the mammography 
model.  We experimented with using an additional instrument in each of the two demand models 
consisting of the binary variable associated with the preventive service knowledge question in 
the other demand model.  For example, in the model for mammograms, the instrumental 
variables used were general Medicare program knowledge and knowledge of the flu shot benefit. 
These additional variables yielded little additional predictive value as instruments and resulted in 
rejection of the test for our exclusion restrictions.  This latter finding could be a refection of the 
fact that a “taste” for preventive care is common to both services.  
  We also examined interaction effects of benefits knowledge with prior use, both by 
adding an interaction term to our models and by estimating separate regressions for those with 
and without prior use. For flu shot use, OLS estimation of the model with an interaction yielded 
a positive and significant main effect for benefits knowledge of 0.055 and a significant 




variables endogenous, yielded implausibly large coefficients that were very sensitive to the 
choice of instruments. In the separate sample regressions, OLS estimation yielded significantly 
positive benefit knowledge coefficients of 0.111 and 0.068 for those with and without prior flu 
shot use respectively. Two-stage estimation yielded a small and insignificantly positive benefits 
knowledge coefficient for those with no prior use and a very large (0.334) and significant 
coefficient for those with prior use. 
  For mammography, OLS estimation of the model with an interaction yielded a positive 
and significant main effect for benefits knowledge of 0.082 and a moderately significant (p = 
0.078) interaction effect of 0.053. Two-stage estimates, with both the main and interaction 
knowledge variables endogenous, yielded large and imprecise coefficient estimates. In the 
separate sample regressions, OLS estimation yielded very similar positive and significant 
coefficients of 0.110 and 0.090 for those with and without prior mammography use respectively. 
Two-stage estimation yielded significantly positive benefits knowledge coefficients of 0.285 and 
0.170 for those with and without prior use respectively. 
  Taken together, these various results suggest that the positive benefits knowledge effects 
on use are larger in magnitude for persons with prior use. It is also true, however, that persons 
with prior use will tend to have better benefit knowledge. (Mean values of FLUKNOW were 
0.852 and 0.631 for persons with and without prior use respectively.  Corresponding means for 
MAMKNOW were 0.802 and 0.506.) Thus, our results do not necessarily suggest that education 
efforts should be targeted specifically to those with prior use; we suspect that it is more cost 
effective to target these efforts to groups that have the lowest average level of benefit knowledge. 
Discussion 
To place the results just described in a broader context, it is useful to compare them with 




knowledge impacts on demand for services is qualitatively similar to knowledge effects reported 
by Hsieh and Lin (1997) and by Kenkel (1990).  Our application differs from these previous 
works, however, in that knowledge in our study basically measures awareness that the out of 
pocket price of a preventive service is zero; thus a positive knowledge effect is clearly to be 
expected and is logically consistent with rational consumer behavior.  We also note that our main 
result is robust to estimation technique (OLS vs. TSLS), and to the inclusion or exclusion of a 
measure of prior service utilization as an explanatory variable.  Inclusion of this variable does, 
however, diminish the magnitude of the knowledge effect.  
Our study differed from Hsieh and Lin (1997) by including education variables in the 
structural demand function rather than simply using them as instruments for our knowledge 
variables.  In both our OLS and instrumental variables results, however, we find little evidence 
of a general education effect on demand.  (We do note that the coefficients for the education 
dummies in the mammography regressions suggest the presence of a positive education gradient 
in demand.)  In alternative empirical models, we tried repeating the approach of Kenkel (1990) 
and Hsieh and Lin (1997) to include education as instrument in addition to our other knowledge 
variables.  This approach yielded similar results.  Thus, our results provide support to Hsieh and 
Lin’s presumption that when more focused measures of knowledge are available, measures of 
general educational attainment can be used as instruments and excluded from the structural 
demand function.  
Our results for flu shot demand can also be compared directly to the recent findings by 
Mullahy (1999).  His analysis, based on 1991 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), 
indicates that self-assessed health status has a strong negative relationship to flu shot demand 
while years of schooling is a strongly positive predictor.  While these results contrast to our own 




African Americans.  There are important differences in model specification, which could easily 
explain the differences in results.  These include our inclusion of income as a demand factor and 
the absence from the NHIS data set of many of the variables relating to health and disability 
status used in our analysis.  
The policy implications of our study are significant in a climate where CMS desires 
elderly beneficiaries to play a greater role in their own health service utilization as well as health 
plan choice.  The results show that knowledge is an important attribute in medical care demand.  
Few health care empirical studies measure knowledge directly.  The rapidly growing consumer 
choice and information literature provides data on self-reported information sources and health 
plan choice. With the development of different benefit options for CMS beneficiaries on the 
horizon, policy evaluations should consider recording measures of benefit knowledgeas well as 
information sources to better understand the value of information dissemination. 
An obvious extension of to our analysis would be to examine the impact of Medicare 
program knowledge on medical expenditures.  This analysis could be used to compute the net 
fiscal impact to Medicare of funds spent on direct consumer education campaigns. Given the 
fiscal realities of an aging population, a future analysis of the relationship between knowledge, 
preventive services use, and health care expenditures would be valuable.    
Conclusions 
  Economists commonly assume that consumers make rational choices with perfect 
information. In health care, however, most consumers understand relatively little about the 
consequences of their purchases or even the complex arrangements under which these purchases 
are made.  In this study we specifically focus on consumer knowledge of insurance benefits as it 
affects demand for preventive health services. We find that even controlling for prior use (which 




is one of the strongest factors affecting the use of influenza vaccination in the non-
institutionalized elderly population and mammography screening within the female non-
institutionalized elderly.  Our findings suggest that strategies to educate the insured Medicare 
population about coverage of preventive services may have substantial social value.  Our 
findings of positive income and insurance effects on demand (in the context of full coverage for 
these preventive services), as well as race/ethnicity differences (especially for flu shots) suggest 
that complementarities exist between demand for curative and preventive services and that 
policies to reduce social disparities in the receipt of curative care among Medicare enrollees will 





Table 1          
Variable Names and Descriptive Statistics       
                   
     Total (N=7,473) 
Female Only 
(N=4,296) 
      Standard    Standard   
Variable  Beneficiary Characteristic Definition  Mean  Deviation  Mean  Deviation 
                    
            
Dependent Variables          
  FLUSHOT   
Received Medicare reimbursed flu shot=1, else 
0  0.387 0.487  --  -- 
  MAMMOGRM   Received mammogram=1, else 0   --  --  0.285  0.451 
Benefit Knowledge Variables          
  FLUKNOW  Knowledge of flu shot benefit=1, else 0  0.775  0.418  --  -- 
  MAMKNOW    Knowledge of mammography benefit=1, else 0  --  --  0.674  0.469 
Prior Use Variables          
  PRIORFLU  Received flu shot in prior year=1, else 0  0.653  0.476  --  -- 
  PRIORMAM  Received mammogram in prior year=1, else 0  --  --  0.406  0.491 
Knowledge Instrument Variables          
  MCAREKNOW_A  Knowledge of assigned provider rule=1, else 0  0.674  0.469  0.671  0.470 
  MCAREKNOW_B  Knowledge of appeal process=1, else 0  0.760  0.427  0.739  0.439 
Neighborhood Variables          
  FLU NEIGBOR  Beneficiary's Zip code average flu shot rate  0.887  0.183  --  -- 
  MAM NEIGBOR 
Beneficiary's Zip code average mammography 
rate --  --  0.198  0.227 
Other Independent Variables          
  WHITE  Reference race category       
  HISPANIC  Race is Hispanic=1, else 0  0.062  0.241  0.059  0.236 
  BLACK      Race is black=1, else 0  0.088  0.283  0.095  0.293 
  OTHER RACE  Race is not white, Hispanic or black=1, else 0  0.018  0.135  0.019  0.138 
  DUAL ELLIGIBILITY      Dually eligible for Medicaid=1, else 0  0.101  0.301  0.131  0.337 
  MEDIGAP    Supplemental insurance=1, else 0  0.711  0.453  0.703  0.457 
  RURAL      Outside metropolitan statistical area=1, else 0  0.295  0.456  0.292  0.455 
  VISION PROBLEM   Vision problem=1, else 0   0.406  0.491  0.424  0.494 
  HEARING PROBLEM   Hearing problem=, else 0   0.453  0.498  0.394  0.489 
  EDUCATION LEVEL1  Reference education category        
  EDUCATION LEVEL2  Completed 5th grade - 8th grade=1, else 0  0.167  0.389  0.164  0.370 
  EDUCATION LEVEL3  Completed 9th grade - 11th grade=1, else 0  0.165  0.365  0.183  0.387 
  EDUCATION LEVEL4  Completed 12th grade=1, else 0  0.320  0.464  0.337  0.473 
  EDUCATION LEVEL5  Education beyond 12th grade=1, else 0  0.272  0.438  0.249  0.433 
  EXC/GOOD HEALTH  Excellent to good health=1, else 0  0.778  0.412  0.769  0.421 
  NO ADLS  Reference ADL category        
  ADL1TO3    1 to 3 ADL restrictions=1, else 0  0.158  0.369  0.189  0.392 
  ADL4TO5    4 to 5 ADL restrictions=1, else 0  0.032  0.181  0.039  0.193 
  IADLTELE   Unable to use telephone=1, else 0  0.072  0.251  0.059  0.236 
  IADLBILS   Unable to pay bills=1, else 0  0.069  0.269  0.079  0.270 
  MALE       Male gender=1, else 0  0.422  0.494  --  -- 
  NORTHEAST  Reference region category        




  SOUTH      Resides in Southern US State=1, else 0  0.350  0.481  0.360  0.480 
  WEST       Resides in Western US State=1, else 0  0.206  0.399  0.206  0.405 
  PUERTO RICO  Resides in Puerto Rico=1, else 0  0.016  0.111  0.015  0.122 
  AGE6574  Reference age category        
  AGE7584    Aged 75 to 84 years=1, else 0  0.408  0.492  0.425  0.494 
  OVER85     Over aged 85 years=1, else 0  0.138  0.369  0.158  0.365 
  INCOME LEVEL1  Reference income category        
  INCOME LEVEL2  Income level is $15,001 - $30,000, else 0  0.334  0.472  0.299  0.458 
  INCOME LEVEL3  Income level is $30,001 or more, else 0  0.215  0.411  0.158  0.365 
  HEART      Heart disease history=1, else 0  0.375  0.484  0.360  0.480 
  STROKE     Stroke history=1, else 0  0.105  0.307  0.105  0.306 
  CANCER     Cancer history=1, else 0  0.172  0.377  0.174  0.379 
  DIABTS     Diabetes history=1, else 0  0.151  0.358  0.145  0.352 
  EMPHYS     Emphysema history=1, else 0  0.132  0.338  0.120  0.325 
  MARRY      Married=1, else 0  0.534  0.499  0.376  0.484 
  HOUSEHOLD COMP  Total number of individuals in household  1.912  0.980  1.802  1.029 






Table 2        
First Stage Regression Results of Factors Explaining Flu Shot and Mammography Knowledge 
                         
  FLUKNOW  MAMKNOW             
Explanatory Variable  OLS Coef. T-stat OLS  Coef. T-stat            
INTERCEPT    0.407  11.280  0.275  6.160            
MCAREKNOW_A  0.126  12.170  0.149  9.650            
MCAREKNOW_B  0.173  14.770  0.175  10.350            
PRIORFLU  0.183  18.730  --  --            
PRIORMAM  --  --  0.169  12.020            
NEIGHBOR -0.009  -0.370  -0.031  -1.040            
HISPANIC 0.036  1.560  0.075  2.150            
BLACK      -0.048  -2.760  0.049  1.960            
OTHER RACE  0.013  0.380  -0.043  -0.870            
DUAL ELLIGIBILITY      0.020  1.120  0.054  2.190            
MEDIGAP    0.053  4.510  0.063  3.520            
RURAL      0.037  3.550  -0.010  -0.650            
VISION PROBLEM   -0.017  -0.830  -0.006  -0.170            
HEARING PROBLEM   0.010  0.470  0.044  1.370            
EDUCATION LEVEL2  -0.002  -0.110  0.058  1.830            
EDUCATION LEVEL3  -0.023  -1.080  0.079  2.380            
EDUCATION LEVEL4  -0.002  -0.250  -0.032  -2.220            
EDUCATION LEVEL5  0.013  1.380  0.012  0.850            
EXC/GOOD HEALTH  -0.008  -0.660  -0.009  -0.520            
ADL1TO3    0.004  0.300  -0.031  -1.670            
ADL4TO5    0.038  1.340  -0.027  -0.690            
IADLTELE   -0.010  -0.520  0.008  0.260            
IADLBILS   -0.006  -0.270  -0.070  -2.420            
MALE       -0.062  -6.180  --  --            
NORTH CENTRAL   0.027  1.870  0.021  0.990            
SOUTH      0.037  2.740  0.043  2.150            
WEST       0.010  0.680  0.074  3.320            
PUERTO RICO  0.073  1.720  0.131  2.02            
AGE7584    -0.007  -0.690  -0.032  -2.090            
OVER85     -0.023  -1.530  -0.075  -3.390            
INCOME LEVEL2  0.001  0.090  0.011  0.640            
INCOME LEVEL3  -0.014  -0.930  0.004  0.170            
HEART      0.028  2.850  0.024  1.610            
STROKE     -0.025  -1.640  -0.025  -1.130            
CANCER     -0.003  -0.220  0.030  1.680            
DIABTS     0.023  1.780  0.060  3.050            
EMPHYS     0.007  0.490  0.000  0.000            
MARRY      0.036  3.180  -0.007  -0.420            
HOUSEHOLD COMP  -0.010  -2.020  -0.001  -0.110            
                  




F-statistic 37.37    21.61             
N 7,473    4296             
                  
Notes:                   
   Estimates in bold are significant at P<0.05 or less.                






Table 3        
Regression Results for Flu Shot Benefit Knowledge and Flu Shot Demand   
                 
    
Instrumental 
Variables      
Explanatory Variable  OLS Coefficient T-stat 2SLS  Coefficient T-stat    
INTERCEPT    -0.129  -3.140  -0.176  -3.680    
FLUKNOW  0.092  7.280  0.182  3.770    
PRIORFLU  0.316  27.920  0.299  20.470    
NEIGHBOR 0.029  1.03  0.028  1    
HISPANIC  -0.084  -3.270  -0.084  -3.250    
BLACK      -0.060  -3.080  -0.054  -2.710    
OTHER RACE  -0.052  -1.350  -0.052  -1.330    
DUAL 
ELLIGIBILITY      0.111  5.420  0.109  5.330    
MEDIGAP    0.209  15.610  0.202  14.530    
RURAL      0.060  5.110  0.056  4.700    
VISION PROBLEM   -0.004  -0.190  -0.004  -0.170    
HEARING 
PROBLEM   -0.008  -0.350  -0.012  -0.480    
EDUCATION 
LEVEL2 0.006  0.260  0.003  0.130    
EDUCATION 
LEVEL3 -0.005  -0.220  -0.007  -0.290    
EDUCATION 
LEVEL4  0.007  0.640  0.007  0.670    
EDUCATION 
LEVEL5 0.018  1.690  0.017  1.550    
EXC/GOOD 
HEALTH 0.014  0.990  0.013  0.970    
ADL1TO3    -0.023  -1.490  -0.023  -1.520    
ADL4TO5    -0.063  -1.950  -0.066  -2.060    
IADLTELE   -0.008  -0.380  -0.008  -0.350    
IADLBILS   0.016  0.680  0.016  0.690    
MALE       -0.004  -0.330  0.002  0.160    
NORTH CENTRAL   0.030  1.860  0.027  1.650    
SOUTH      0.017  1.130  0.013  0.830    
WEST       -0.105  -6.170  -0.107  -6.270    
PUERTO RICO  0.024  0.490  0.015  0.300    
AGE7584    0.019  1.670  0.019  1.720    
OVER85     0.017  1.010  0.021  1.230    
INCOME LEVEL2  0.001  0.040  -0.001  -0.080    
INCOME LEVEL3  0.012  0.700  0.012  0.700    
HEART      0.024  2.180  0.021  1.860    
STROKE     0.003  0.170  0.005  0.300    
CANCER     0.044  3.250  0.044  3.250    
DIABTS     -0.009  -0.580  -0.011  -0.730    




MARRY      0.006  0.440  0.001  0.100    
HOUSEHOLD 
COMP 0.004  0.730  0.005  0.860    
           
Adjusted R-square  0.1994    0.19503      
F-statistic 52.71    51.29      
N 7,473    7,473      
Pr, Test of Overid      0.4303      






Table 4          
Regression Results for Mammography Benefit Knowledge and Mammography Screening Demand 
                   
    
Instrumental 
Variables        
Explanatory Variable  OLS Coefficient T-stat  2SLS  Coefficient  T-stat     
INTERCEPT    0.082  1.950  0.032  0.670      
MAMKNOW  0.098  7.020  0.215  3.950      
PRIORMAM  0.195  14.370  0.175  10.710      
NEIGHBOR  -0.056  -1.980  -0.050  -1.770      
HISPANIC 0.001  0.030  -0.002  -0.070      
BLACK      0.007  0.280  0.004  0.180      
OTHER RACE  -0.146  -3.130  -0.139  -2.950      
DUAL 
ELLIGIBILITY      0.099  4.270  0.093  3.930      
MEDIGAP    0.165  9.800  0.154  8.760      
RURAL      0.035  2.440  0.036  2.470      
VISION PROBLEM   -0.042  -1.410  -0.043  -1.410      
HEARING 
PROBLEM   -0.060  -1.970  -0.068  -2.190      
EDUCATION 
LEVEL2  -0.032  -1.080  -0.043  -1.420      
EDUCATION 
LEVEL3 -0.003  -0.090  -0.017  -0.530      
EDUCATION 
LEVEL4 -0.003  -0.200  0.001  0.090      
EDUCATION 
LEVEL5  0.009  0.680  0.008  0.560      
EXC/GOOD 
HEALTH 0.027  1.600  0.027  1.570      
ADL1TO3    -0.025  -1.430  -0.022  -1.210      
ADL4TO5    -0.010  -0.280  -0.008  -0.210      
IADLTELE   -0.072  -2.390  -0.074  -2.450      
IADLBILS   -0.006  -0.210  0.001  0.040      
NORTH CENTRAL   -0.012  -0.570  -0.015  -0.730      
SOUTH      -0.012  -0.620  -0.018  -0.940      
WEST       -0.113  -5.330  -0.125  -5.660      
PUERTO RICO  -0.045  -0.740  -0.064  -1.020      
AGE7584    -0.072  -5.040  -0.068  -4.670      
OVER85     -0.151  -7.160  -0.139  -6.330      
INCOME LEVEL2  0.012  0.680  0.008  0.440      
INCOME LEVEL3  0.074  3.310  0.071  3.170      
HEART      0.019  1.340  0.015  1.050      
STROKE     0.013  0.630  0.016  0.750      
CANCER     0.064  3.840  0.061  3.600      
DIABTS     -0.002  -0.100  -0.009  -0.490      
EMPHYS     -0.016  -0.800  -0.018  -0.890      




HOUSEHOLD COMP  -0.008  -1.180  -0.008  -1.200      
             
Adjusted R-square  0.174    0.166        
F-statistic 26.770    25.410        
N 4296    4296        
Pr, Test of Overid      0.409        
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MCBS KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONS 
 
  The five questions below are the items from the MCBS survey that we used to measure 
consumer knowledge. The first two items pertain to flu shot and mammography coverage.  The 
fourth and fifth items, which pertain to general knowledge about Medicare program rules, were 
used as instruments. All items were coded as binary 0-1 variables with 1 signifying the correct 
answer and 0 signifying all other answers. 
 
 
1. Medicare pays for flu shots.  [PROBE:  Do you think this is true or false, or are you not sure?] 
 
 TRUE  ...............................................  1 
 FALSE  ..............................................  2 
 NOT  SURE  ......................................  3 
 REFUSED  ........................................  -7 
 
 
    IF SP IS FEMALE, ASK 2.  ELSE, SKIP TO 3 
 
 
2.  Medicare pays for a mammogram every two years.  [A mammogram is an X-ray to check 
for breast cancer.]  [PROBE:  Do you think this is true or false, or are you not sure?] 
 
 TRUE  ...............................................  1 
 FALSE  ..............................................  2 
 NOT  SURE  ......................................  3 
 REFUSED  ........................................  -7 
 
 
3.  Medicare pays for an annual physical examination.  [PROBE:  Do you think this is true or 
false, or are you not sure?] 
 
 TRUE  ...............................................  1 
 FALSE  ..............................................  2 
 NOT  SURE  ......................................  3 
 REFUSED  ........................................  -7 
 
 
4.  A doctor who accepts assignment can’t charge more than Medicare allows for covered 
services.  [PROBE:  Do you think this is true or false, or are you not sure?] 
 
 TRUE  ...............................................  1 




 NOT  SURE  ......................................  3 
 REFUSED  ........................................  -7 
 
 
5.  If you don’t agree with a decision Medicare makes on a claim from a doctor or hospital, 
such as whether it will cover the service or how much it will pay, you can appeal the 
decision.  [PROBE:  Do you think this is true or false, or are you not sure?] 
 
 TRUE  ...............................................  1 
 FALSE  ..............................................  2 
 NOT  SURE  ......................................  3 
 REFUSED  ........................................  -7 
 
 